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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Five firms had garment factories in the Rana Plaza building when it collapsed on 
24th April 2013, namely Ether Tex Ltd, New Wave Bottoms Ltd, New Wave Style Ltd, 
Phantom Apparels Ltd and Phantom Tac Ltd.1 It is highly unlikely that consumers 
who bought garments made by these firms would have recognised their names. 
What consumers would have recognised were the names of the brands under 
which the garments were marketed and sold such as Primark, Matalan, Joe Fresh, 
Mango, Bon Marché, Asda and Walmart.2 The collapse of Rana Plaza, which killed 
over 1,100 people most of them workers in the factories, focused attention on the 
brands. This publicity tended to portray the brands as culpable even though they 
                                                          
1 The building was located in Savar on the outskirts of Dhaka: see “Bangladesh mourns Latest Factory 
Disaster”, Asia Times, 25 April 2013, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-
03-250413.html (accessed 1 June 2018); “Rana Plaza: One Year on from the Bangladesh Factory 
Disaster”, The Guardian, 19 April 2014, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/19/rana-plaza-bangladesh-one-year-on (accessed 
11 June 2018). See further All Party Parliamentary Group on Bangladesh, After Rana Plaza: A Report 
into the Readymade Garment Industry in Bangladesh, (2013) (“APPG Report”), available at 
http://www.rochdaleonline.co.uk/uploads/f1/news/document/20131119_154658.pdf (accessed 11 
June 2018); M. Anner, J. Bair and J. Blasi, “Toward Joint Liability in Global Supply Chains: Addressing 
the Root Causes of Labor Violations in International Subcontracting Nertworks”, (2013) 35 
Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 1-43 at 1-2; A. Rühmkorf, Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Private Law and Global Supply Chains (Edward Elgar, 2015) at 147-156. See also Das v George 
Weston Limited, 2017 ONSC 4129 at [81]-[98]. 
2 Ibid.  
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had no legal responsibility for the safety and wellbeing of those working there.3 This 
attribution of blame reflected awareness of the strategic power that brand owners 
enjoy as lead firms in the garment (or apparel) industry, of the pressure that lead 
firms can put on other firms in their supply chains and of the impact that this 
pressure can have on working conditions, the environment and other matters 
related to production.4  
In the garment industry, as with many other industries, the main actors are 
rarely large-scale manufacturing firms of the kind that used to be major actors in an 
economy.5 Manufacturing firms of that kind would have competed to pull demand 
from consumers to their specific products (even if they did not deal directly with 
consumers) and organised their production in-house under the direct control of 
their management.6 Instead, the main actors are now brand owners who specialise 
in the retail or marketing of products. As brand owners, they still have control over 
the design and development of the products they market and sell and still compete 
to pull demand from consumers to these specific products. However, they do not 
produce “their” products in-house, but outsource this activity to other firms in 
chains or networks of suppliers that may be located around the world.7 This 
                                                          
3 See, for example, the judgments of the Superior Court of Delaware and the Ontario Supreme Court 
of Justice in Rahaman et al. v JC Penney Corporation, Inc., The Children’s Place and Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. (2015) (Case 1:15-cv-00619-KBJ); Das v George Weston Limited, 2017 ONSC 4129. 
4 APPG Report, n. 1, at 7 and 42. See generally N. Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies 
(Flamingo, 2000). 
5 On this model, see M. Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Polity 
Press, 1990) at 46-73. On the change, see J. Lee and G. Gereffi, “Global Value Chains, Rising Power 
Firms and Economic and Social Upgrading”, (2015) 11 Critical Perspectives on International Business 
319-339. 
6 M. Wilkins, “The Neglected Intangible Asset: The Influence of the Trade Mark on the Rise of the 
Modern Corporation”, (1992) 34 Business History 66-95;  
7 R. Feenstra, “Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy”, (1998) 
12 Journal of Economic Perspectives 31-50; R.N. Langlois, “The Vanishing Hand: The Changing 
Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism”, (2003) 12 Industrial and Corporate Change 351-385; G. Gereffi 
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disaggregation and externalisation of production has major economic actors to 
become “weightless” inasmuch as their main assets are intangible and they focus 
can their resources and capabilities on higher-value activities whilst externalising 
the risks and responsibilities of production.8 Moreover, as “lead firms”, the brand 
owners have strategic control in the chains of economic activity in which they 
operate (“global value chains”).9 
The production and distribution of products to consumers occurs along a 
sequence of distinct value-adding stages that can be viewed overall as a chain or 
network.10 The nature of these stages can change over time for various reasons and 
this may affect the range of activities of the firms along the chain and the 
structuring of the dealings between different stages. The outsourcing of production 
is an example of this kind of change and it has enabled retailers and marketing firms 
to become “engineers or architects of complex and extended patterns of co-
ordinated activity”.11 As brand owners, these firms can not only determine the 
                                                          
and J. Lee, “Why the World Suddenly Cares About Global Supply Chains”, (2012) 48 Journal of Supply 
Chain Management 24-32; D. Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many 
and What Can Be Done to Improve It (Harvard University Press, 2014) at 7-27. 
8 N. Klein, n. 4, at 4 and 202; F. Palpacuer, “Bringing the Social Context Back In: Governance and 
Wealth Distribution in Global Commodity Chains”, (2008) 37 Economy and Society 393-419 at 395-
405; J. Froud et al, “Financialization across the Pacific: Manufacturing Cost Ratios, Supply Chains and 
Power”, (2014) 25 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 46-57. 
9 P. Gibbon, J. Bair and S. Ponte, “Governing Global Value Chains: An Introduction”, (2008) 37 
Economy and Society 315-338; S. Ponte and T. Sturgeon, “Explaining Governance in Global Value 
Chains: A Modular Theory-Building Effort”, (2014) 21 Review of International Political Economy 195-
223; J. Lee and G. Gereffi, n. 5. Global value chains were originally termed “global commodity 
chains”: G. Gereffi, “The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How U.S. Retailers 
Shape Overseas Production Networks”, in G. Gereffi and M. Korzeniewicz (eds), Commodity Chains 
and Global Capitalism (Praeger, 1994) 95-122. The term “global production networks” has also been 
used to bring out the dynamic and flexible character they can have and the different sources of 
influence on them: J. Bair, “Analysing Economic Organization: Embedded Networks and Global 
Chains Compared”, (2008) 37 Economy and Society 339-364; J. Bair and F. Palpacuer, “CSR Beyond 
the Corporation: Contested Governance in Global Value Chains”, (2015) 15 Global Networks S1-S19. 
10 G.B. Richardson, “The Organisation of Industry”, (1972) 82 Economic Journal 883-896; R.N. 
Langlois, n. 7.  
11 G.B. Richardson, n. 10, at 885. 
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design, quality and other characteristics of the products emerging from the value 
chains in which they operate, but also play an active role in shaping and co-
ordinating activity within the chains.12 Outsourcing production has enabled brand 
owners to reduce their costs substantially, but also to increase their returns 
substantially through exploiting business models that involve the rapid upgrading of 
products and require speed and flexibility at the production stage. These models 
include the “fast fashion” business model used in the garment industry.13 
Blame for the Rana Plaza disaster has been directed both at the garment 
industry’s institutional structure and the fast fashion business model of the brand 
owners.14 One aim of this article is to consider how the law’s recognition and 
protection of trade marks (which provide the signifiers and legal anchors of brands) 
has facilitated the disaggregation of production into global value chains, 
strengthened the strategic power of brand owners within these chains and 
encouraged the adoption of business models such as fast fashion.15 The article will 
show how ownership of trade marks has enabled some firms to separate the 
demand-related activities of product design, product development and marketing 
                                                          
12 P. Gibbon, J. Bair and S. Ponte, n. 9, at 319; S. Ponte and T. Sturgeon, n. 9, at 327-328. 
13 C. Campbell, “The Curse of the New: How the Accelerating Pursuit of the New is Driving Hyper-
Consumption”, in K.M. Ekström (ed), Waste Management and Sustainable Consumption (Routledge, 
2015) 29-51 at 39-40. 
14 M. Anner, J. Bair and J. Blasi, n. 1; I.M. Taplin, “Who is to Blame? A Re-examination of Fast Fashion 
after the 2013 Factory Disaster in Bangladesh”, (2014) 10 Critical Perspectives on International 
Business 72-83; Social Europe Report no. 3, “After Rana Plaza (January 2015), available at 
https://www.socialeurope.eu/book/ser-3-after-rana-plaza/ (accessed 11 June 2018). 
15 In the European Union, trade mark law has been substantially harmonised pursuant to Directive 
89/104/EEC (codified as Directive 2008/95/EC) (“Directive”), which the Trade Marks Act 1994 (“1994 
Act”) implemented in the United Kingdom. Member states are required to implement the Recast 
Directive 2015/2436, (“Recast Directive”) by early 2019, though this will not significantly alter the 
law relevant to the issues addressed in this article.  
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from the supply-related activity of production and to reconfigure the value chains in 
which they operate on this basis.16  
Trade mark law makes this contribution through giving firms exclusive 
property rights over names, logos and other signs that they can use to solicit and 
attract demand to products that only they can supply and to build up an established 
power to attract demand (“goodwill”) as a distinct asset that need not be tied to 
one firm or a continuing set of production arrangements.17 This has enabled some 
firms to manage and develop demand-attraction and supply-provision separately in 
order to maximise their overall profits. The opportunity to do this has become 
particularly attractive with the rise of the financial form of capitalism that has 
accompanied the rise of the market globalisation since the late 1980s.18 In terms of 
demand-attraction, firms can use trade marks to market their products more 
effectively and build goodwill for them both through giving them distinctive 
identities as products (these identities roughly equating to “brands”) and through 
providing convenient reference points for promotional activity and other 
communication. These brands (which may be product-focused or broader and 
corporate in nature) can substantially increase the appeal of products to consumers 
and, in effect, add substantial intangible value to them.19 The success of trade 
                                                          
16 On marketing, see R. Church and A. Godley, “The Emergence of Modern Marketing: International 
Dimensions”, (2003) 45 Business History 1-5. 
17 On “goodwill”, see Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Muller & Co.’s Margarine [1901] AC 217 at 
223-224. See further R. Bone, “Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark 
Law” (2006) 86 Boston University Law Review 547-622. 
18 P. Gibbon, J. Bair and S. Ponte, n. 9, at 325-326. See further J. Froud, A. Leaver and K. Williams, 
“New Actors in a Financialised Economy and the Remaking of Capitalism”, (2007) 12 New Political 
Economy 339-347. 
19 On the different kinds of branding, see C.A. Corrado and J.X. Hao, “Brands as Productive Assets: 
Concepts, Measurement and Global Trends”, (2014) WIPO Economic Research Working Paper No. 13 
at 10. 
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marks and the brands they signify at doing this can turn them into valuable assets 
and strategic resources.20  
In terms of supply-provision, trade mark law gives firms discretion as to how 
they organise the production or procurement of the products that their trade marks 
identify and to change these arrangements if they so decide.21 Nevertheless, the 
brands that the trade marks signify provide continuing and apparently stable focal 
points for attracting demand and building goodwill that transcend their institutional 
structures and production arrangements.22 They can help to mask complexity 
institutional complexity and significant changes in legal structures and production 
arrangements from consumers and thereby help to facilitate organisational 
innovation. 
The Rana Plaza disaster revealed an institutional structure whereby the 
most powerful actors in an industry are separated from the activity of production 
along with its risks and responsibilities and it will be argued that trade mark law can 
help to explain the evolution of this structure and the power that brand owners can 
enjoy within it. However, outsourcing production can expose brand owners to 
certain new risks in return for reducing the costs and increasing the flexibility of 
production. The Rana Plaza disaster illustrated their vulnerability to bad publicity 
                                                          
20 WIPO, 2013: World Intellectual Property Report: Brands – Reputation and Image in the Global 
Marketplace (WIPO Economics and Statistics Series, 2013), at 3, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/944/wipo_pub_944_2013.pdf (accessed 11 June 
2018). 
21 Bostitch TM [1963] RPC 183 at 197; Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 at [38]-
[39]. 
22 D.J. Brennan, “The Trade Mark and the Firm”, [2006] IPQ 283-290; D.L. Burk and B.H. McDonnell, 
“Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm”, (2010) 51 William and May Law Review 345-394 
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and this vulnerability gives them a significant “Achilles’ heel”.23 This raises the 
question of how far brand owners can really escape the risks and responsibilities of 
production through outsourcing and the second aim of this article is to address this 
question. Thus, it is noteworthy that, whilst brand owners have little if any legal 
responsibility for the business behaviour of their suppliers,24 the bad publicity 
focused on certain brands following the Rana Plaza disaster led many of them to 
respond with actions and initiatives that were designed to demonstrate their 
commitment to minimising the risk of recurrence. This “Achilles’ heel” has even 
prompted suggestions that brands constitute a “transmission mechanism” that may 
put sufficient countervailing pressure on their owners to force them to take 
responsibility for working conditions, environmental impact and other aspects of 
business behaviour in their supply chains and to ensure that these are 
satisfactory.25  On this basis, trade marks as the signifiers of brands could 
themselves offset or at least mitigate the pressure that their owners’ strategic 
power and business models would otherwise apply down their value chains. This 
article will review this claim and argue that there are significant shortcomings in the 
alleged transmission mechanism.  
The article will proceed as follows. Section 2 will briefly review the Rana 
Plaza disaster as exemplifying the pressures that can ensue when production is 
                                                          
23 On the use of this metaphor to refer to this vulnerability of brands, see for example M. Anner, J. 
Bair and J. Blasi, n. 1, at 4; M. Chon, “Trademark Goodwill as a Public Good: Brands and Innovations 
in Corporate Social Responsibility”, (2017) 21 Lewis & Clark Law Review 277-316 at 289. 
24 R. Mares, “The Limits of Supply Chain Responsibility: A Critical Analysis of Corporate Responsibility 
Instruments”, (2010) 79 Nordic Journal of International Law 193-244; L. Talbot, Great Debates in 
Company Law (Palgrave, 2014) at 108-137; A. Rühmkorf, n. 1.  
25  S. Hilton, “The Social Value of Brands”, in R. Clifton and J. Simmons (eds), Brands and Branding 
(The Economist in association with Profile Books, 2003) 47-64 at 55. 
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externalised within global value chains and brand owners as lead firms pursue 
business models that require low costs and a rapid turnaround of production. 
Section 3 will look more closely at the factors that have enabled the main actors in 
many industries to outsource production and to have sufficient control for their 
purposes within global value chains. Section 4 will show how trade marks as the 
signifiers and legal anchors of brands have contributed to this organisational 
change and encouraged lead firms to exploit business models based on the rapid 
upgrading of products. Section 5 will consider how far trade marks and the brands 
they signify constitute an “Achilles’ heel” for their owners and transmit 
countervailing pressure concerning working conditions and business behaviour at 
the production stage in global value chains. Section 6 will draw some conclusions. 
 
2. RANA PLAZA: AN EXAMPLE OF THE POTENTIAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF DISAGGREGATING PRODUCTION 
INTO GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS? 
Rana Plaza was planned in 2004 as a six-storey building with shops, offices and 
apartments and not as one suitable for industrial use.26 However, in response to the 
                                                          
26 “Bangladesh: British Firms did not follow New Safety Regime for Clothing Production”, The Daily 
Telegraph, 2 May 2013, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/bangladesh/10034090/Bangladesh-British-firms-
did-not-follow-new-safety-regime-for-clothing-production.html (accessed 11 June 2018); 
“Bangladesh: Rana Plaza Architect says Building Never meant for Factories”, The Daily Telegraph, 3 
May 2013, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/bangladesh/10036546/Bangladesh-Rana-Plaza-
architect-says-building-was-never-meant-for-factories.html (accessed 11 June 2018). See further Das 
v George Weston Limited, 2017 ONSC 4129 [81]-[98]. 
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growing demand in Bangladesh for premises for garment factories, it ended up as 
an eight-storey building with factories and machinery on five upper floors and large 
power generators on its roof. On 23rd April 2013, large cracks appeared in the 
building, which was evacuated and declared unsafe. On the next day, although 
workers in the shops and banks below stayed away pending an official inspection of 
the building, an engineer commissioned by the building’s owner declared the 
building safe and the factories resumed working.27 Apparently, managers ordered 
the factory workers back to work, threatening them with sanctions for not doing so, 
because of the pressure to meet strict deadlines emanating from the brand owners 
and to avoid the penalties they would otherwise incur.28 Following a power cut, the 
generators were switched on and the vibrations from these apparently caused the 
cracks to widen. The building collapsed soon after, killing over 1,130 people and 
injuring a further 2,500.29 
The rapid growth of garment production in Bangladesh helps to explain the 
strength of the demand for factory premises that led to Rana Plaza having factories 
and machinery despite its unsuitability. Bangladesh had become the world’s second 
largest producer and exporter of ready-made garments, which accounted for 75% 
of its export revenue and 13% of its gross domestic product.30 However, garment 
manufacturers in Bangladesh, such as the firms with factories in Rana Plaza, usually 
operate as subcontractors in global value chains.31 They manufacture garments to 
                                                          
27 APPG Report, n. 1, at 18. 
28 See n. 1. 
29 See n. 1. 
30 APPG Report, n. 1, at 14, citing McKinsey & Company, “Bangladesh’s Ready-Made Garment 
Landscape: The Challenge of Growth” (2011). 
31 APPB Report, n. 1, at 26-27. 
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fulfil orders from brand owners, which they receive directly or through 
intermediate contractors, and for which they must compete. The brand owners 
enjoy the benefits of access to consumers, being able to use marketing to solicit 
and attract demand and the goodwill that familiarity can generate. They also 
determine the timescale of production. 
The dynamics of the fast fashion business model lay behind the pressure on 
the firms in Rana Plaza and their managers to keep the factories working despite 
the obvious danger.32 Garment production is still a labour-intensive industry and so 
the cost and productivity of labour are key contributors to overall production 
costs.33 Outsourcing production into a flexible network of firms that have access to 
relatively cheap, compliant and efficient labour forces is well-suited to this business 
model. The growth of garment production in Bangladesh has reflected the low cost 
and “disempowerment” of the labour force along with favourable changes in the 
international trade regime.34 Brand owners also benefit from the fact that 
manufacturing firms have to compete for their orders and the greater capacity that 
outsourcing production into a flexible value chain gives them to upgrade their 
products frequently and bring new designs to the market rapidly. 
The Rana Plaza disaster provided an extreme and disquieting example of the 
social costs that can follow from enabling brand owners to externalise production 
into global value chains and to exploit business models like fast fashion in their 
                                                          
32 APPB Report, n. 1, at 26-27. 
33 S. Azmeh and K. Nadvi, “Asian Firms and the Restructuring of Global Value Chains”, (2014) 23 
International Business Review 707-717 at 711; L. Curran and K. Nadvi, “Shifting Trade Preferences 
and Value Chain Impacts in the Bangladesh Textiles and Garment Industry”, (2015) 8 Cambridge 
Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 459-475 at 465-466. 
34  APPG Report, n. 1, at 20-22; L. Curran and K. Nadvi, n. 33, at 460-462. 
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pursuit of profit. It provides support for the view that global value chains present a 
formidable challenge to those seeking to improve corporate governance and to 
ensure higher standards of corporate social responsibility in relation to production 
because they have radically changed the legal nature and internal dynamics of what 
it is that needs to be governed and regulated.35 Moreover, the fact that pressure 
from brand owners appears to have exacerbated the consequences of the 
building’s collapse calls into question the view that the risk of bad publicity acts as a 
significant restraint on brand owners. In practice, it seems that association with the 
Rana Plaza disaster has had little impact on the brand owners and their finances 
and this gives further support to this pessimistic view.36  
If the risk of bad publicity concerning working conditions or other matters at 
the production stage were to present a real threat to brand owners, then one might 
expect that firms that could provide credible assurance of good production 
conditions in their value chain would have a good business model for attracting 
demand and building goodwill. However, the history of one of the factories in Rana 
Plaza suggests this is probably not the case, at least not for marketing ready-made 
fast-fashion garments. Phantom Tac Ltd had been set up as a joint venture with an 
ethical fashion brand in Spain with the aim of relaxing deadlines and improving 
working conditions in the expectation that consumers and retailers would be willing 
                                                          
35 J. Bair and F. Palpacuer, n. 9. 
36 Social Europe Report, n. 14; M. Aizawa and S. Tripathi, “Beyond Rana Plaza: Next Steps for the 
Global Garment Industry and Bangladeshi Manufacturers”, (2015) 1 Business and Human Rights 
Journal 145-151; P. Stanwick and S. Stanwick, “The Garment Industry in Bangladesh: A Human Rights 
Challenge”, (2015) 2 Journal of Business & Economic Policy 40-44; N. Sinkovics, S.F. Hoque and R.R. 
Sinkovics, “Rana Plaza Collapse Aftermath: Are CSR Compliance and Auditing Pressures Effective?”, 
(2016) 29 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 617-649; B.W. Jacobs and V.R. Singhal, 
“The Effect of the Rana Plaza Disaster on Shareholder Wealth of Retailers: Implications for Sourcing 
Strategies and Supply Chain Governance”, (2017) 49-51 Journal of Operations Management 52-66. 
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to pay a little more for its products.37 This idealism did not survive the 2008 global 
financial crisis and, like other manufacturing firms in the building, it ended up 
competing for large orders from established brands, offering the terms that were 
necessary to secure these orders and imposing the working conditions that were 
necessary to meet these terms. At the time of the disaster, the firm was apparently 
producing a batch of samples for Mango in the hope of attracting large orders from 
this brand.38 
 
3. THE OUTSOURCING OF PRODUCTION IN GLOBAL 
VALUE CHAINS 
The Rana Plaza disaster revealed an institutional structure for the garment industry 
based on global value chains in which retailers and other brand owners are the lead 
firms.39 The rise of these “weightless” firms,40 with their ability to exercise control 
over production through contractual mechanisms, reflects changes in the 
approaches of major economic actors over the second half of the twentieth century 
both to attracting demand and to organising supply.41 On the demand side, there 
has been a greater focus on product differentiation in design and features along 
                                                          
37 See “Bangladesh Disaster Crushes Owner’s Ideal of Clothes with a Conscience”, Reuters, 16 June 
2013, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-bangladesh-collapse-idUKBRE95F0I320130616 
(accessed 11 June 2018). 
38 Ibid. 
39 On how a “buyer-driven dynamic” seems to have emerged in global value chains in most 
industries, see P. Gibbon, J. Bair and S. Ponte, n. 9, at 320-322. 
40 N. Klein, n. 4. 
41 W. Streeck, “Citizens as Consumers: Considerations on the New Politics of Consumption” (2012) 
76 New Left Review 27-47. 
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with a more rapid pace of product development, upgrading and other forms of 
innovation.42 On the supply side, there have been changes in technology and 
communication, especially digital technology, which have reduced the cost 
advantages of the large-scale mass production of standardised products and 
increased the scope for producing customised products.43 The changes have also 
increased the feasibility of outsourcing production.44 Lead firms can now control 
the development and determine the design and other characteristics of the 
products they sell under their brands without needing to have direct control of the 
manufacturing process. Moreover, their brands enable them to communicate with 
and influence the preferences of consumers, as section 4 will show, regardless of 
whether they deal with consumers directly. With modern forms of communication, 
brand owners can promote and market their products on a global scale,45 which 
helps to secure their control over access to consumer markets. Their brands also 
enable them to build up goodwill with consumers and to appropriate this as an 
asset for their exclusive benefit, further consolidating their strategic position and 
bargaining power. 
Another feature of global value chains of the kind that Rana Plaza illustrated 
is the flexibility of the production stage. Networks of suppliers compete for orders 
from brand owners who can now operate as “global buyers” of production.46 The 
                                                          
42 C. Campbell, n. 13. 
43 S. Berger, “Toward a Third Industrial Divide?” in Paul Osterman (ed) Economy in Society: Essays in 
Honour of Michael J. Piore (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2012) 65-88. 
44 R.N. Langlois, “Modularity in Technology and Organization” (2002) 49 Journal of Economic 
Behaviour and Organization 19-37; S. Ponte and T. Sturgeon, n. 9, at 210-216. 
45 A. Offer, The Challenge of Affluence: Self-Control and Well-Being in the United States and Britain 
since 1950 (OUP, 2006) at 117. 
46 S. Barrientos et al., “Decent Work in Global Production Networks: Framing the Policy Debate”, 
(2011) 150 International Labour Review 299-317 at 302; M.J. Drebes, “Including the ‘Other’: Power 
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brand owners have bargaining power based on their access to consumers and the 
size of the orders they can place.47 In some cases, they may deal with intermediate 
contractors who co-ordinate production and deal with suppliers,48 a development 
which increase the flexibility of the production system. Suppliers must compete 
within these networks for the brand owners’ orders in terms of price and their 
ability to meet tight deadlines.49 This gives the production system some of the 
character of a market, albeit one in which buyers have the bargaining power. This 
has enabled brand owners to appropriate a greater share of the overall profit 
through squeezing the suppliers’ margins.50 It is the intensity of competition within 
these supply networks that has put pressure on suppliers and their managers to 
keep their costs down and to push at the boundaries of regulation concerning 
health and safety, general working conditions, environmental protection and other 
matters of business behaviour.51 
Although there are clear advantages for lead firms from outsourcing 
production into a flexible supply network, the practice has also grown because 
these firms have overcome certain disadvantages that would otherwise have 
negated the benefits. In particular, brand owners need to be sure that the products 
they market under their brands conform to their specifications and are consistent in 
                                                          
and Postcolonialism as Underrepresented Perspectives in the Discourse on Corporate Social 
Responsibility”, (2016) 42 Critical Sociology 105-121 at 106. 
47 S. Ponte and T. Sturgeon, n. 9, at 201-202. 
48 S. Azmeh and K. Nadvi, n. 33. 
49 APPG Report, n. 1, at 7; I.M. Taplin, n. 14, at 73. 
50 This can be seen in the division of the retail price for a T shirt among parties in the value chain: 
“What does that $14 Shirt really cost?”, Maclean’s, 1 May 2013, available at 
http://www.macleans.ca/economy/business/what-does-that-14-shirt-really-cost/ (accessed 11 June 
2018). 
51 M. Anner, J. Bair and J. Blasi, n. 1; M.J. Drebes, n. 46. 
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quality so that they can vouch for them to consumers as “their” branded products. 
Having direct control of production or at least relying only on suppliers who are 
familiar and trusted give brand owners a good basis for having this reassurance and 
in turn for being able to provide reassurance to consumers through branding their 
products. However, improvements in communication and technology along with 
other supply-side changes have increased the ability of brand owners to exercise 
adequate control remotely through contractual mechanisms.  
Analysis of global value chains has identified various factors that help to 
explain why outsourcing production to a network of competing suppliers has 
become much more feasible.52 This analysis has drawn on the economic analysis of 
business structures and the hybrid contractual forms between market transactions 
and directing transactions within a firm.53 Market transactions should be discrete 
and self-contained with their terms as fully-specified as possible and satisfactory 
performance readily verifiable. This self-containment means that parties can be 
substituted for subsequent transactions, allowing greater flexibility and 
competition. In a firm, management has discretionary power over transactions, 
reducing the need for self-containment, but making them more party-dependent. 
The hybrid contractual forms strike varying balances between the respective 
degrees of self-containment and party-dependence in transactions. For value 
                                                          
52 G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey and T. Sturgeon, “The Governance of Global Supply Chains”, (2005) 12 
Review of International Political Economy 78-104 at 81-88; P. Gibbon, J. Bair and S. Ponte, n. 9, at 
319-326; G. Gereffi and J. Lee, n. 8, at 25-26; S. Ponte and T. Sturgeon, n. 9, at 200-210; J. Lee and G. 
Gereffi, n. 5, at 320-322. 
53 This analysis builds on the market and firm dichotomy associated with Ronald Coase: R.H. Coase, 
“The Nature of the Firm”, (1937) 4 Economic NS 386-405. See I. Macneil, “Contracts: Adjustments of 
Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law”, (1978) 72 
Northwestern University Law Review 854-905; O.E. Williamson, “Transaction-Cost Economics: The 
Governance of Contractual Relations”, (1979) 22 Journal of Law and Economics 233-261.  
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chains, three archetypal structures for production have been identified between 
the firm and market transactions, namely “captive”, “relational” and “modular” 
value chains.54 The institutional structure that the Rana Plaza disaster revealed falls 
into the most market-like of these categories, namely modular value chains. The 
greater scope for modularising transactions between different stages in a value 
chain has been identified as a significant step generally for reorganising economic 
activity.55  
One factor that used to favour the in-house or closely-controlled production 
of customised products was its complexity as a series of transactions.56 For firms 
requiring the production of customised products such as fast fashion products, 
ensuring consistent quality and conformity to detailed product specifications are 
important aims as well as minimising production costs and achieving a fast 
turnaround. What makes these transactions complex is the information that needs 
to be communicated and acted upon to achieve the necessary consistency and 
conformity and the evaluation necessary to verify satisfactory performance. The 
production of an order of fast fashion garments requires the transmission, 
implementation and verification within a short time span of a specific design (or set 
of designs) and detailed product specifications. However, developments in 
communication and technology, especially digital technology, have made these 
tasks much easier, thereby reducing the complexity of customised production.57 
The development and adoption of recognised standards, conventions, certification 
                                                          
54 G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey and T. Sturgeon, n. 52, at 83-84 and 86-87. 
55 R.N. Langlois, n. 44. 
56 G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey and T. Sturgeon, n. 52, at 84-87. 
57 R.N. Langlois, n. 7, at 370-376; G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey and T. Sturgeon, n. 52, at 85. 
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systems and the like concerning product quality and other characteristics has 
improved the basis of communication along value chains, further reducing 
complexity and increasing the scope for modularising production.58 
These developments in communication and technology have also reduced 
the significance of another factor that used to work against outsourcing into 
modular value chains as a suitable production system. This was the level of 
capabilities that suppliers needed to have to produce customised products to the 
required level of conformity and consistency.59 Capabilities are the specialist skills, 
tacit knowledge and expertise that a firm needs to have to perform its activities 
properly.60 Where a high level of capabilities is required, as was previously the case, 
then lead firms may have to provide these themselves, as they can with a captive 
value chain, or must find and establish stable relationships with specific suppliers 
with the necessary capabilities, as with a relational value chain. However, the 
developments noted have reduced the need for a high level of capabilities in 
suppliers and favoured modularity.61  
Finally, the brand owners’ adoption of business models that require rapid 
product development and upgrading such as fast fashion has reduced the 
importance of another factor that used to favour direct control or close supervision 
of production, namely being able to spread the costs of an organisational 
                                                          
58 P. Gibbon and S. Ponte, “Quality Conventions, Standards and the Governance of Global Value 
Chains”, (2005) 34 Economy and Society 1-31; P. Gibbon, J. Bair and S. Ponte, n. 9, at 324-326; M. 
Chon, “Marks of Rectitude”, (2009) 77 Fordham Law Review 2311-2351 at 2317-2329; S. Ponte and 
T. Sturgeon, n. 9, at 210-216. 
59 G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey and T. Sturgeon, n. 52, at 85. 
60 G.B. Richardson, n.10, at 888; R.N. Langlois and N.J. Foss, “Capabilities and Governance: The 
Rebirth of Production in the Theory of Economic Organization”, (1999) 52 Kyklos 201-218. 
61 G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey and T. Sturgeon, n. 52, at 86. 
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arrangement involving less self-containment and greater party-dependence over 
many transactions when these transactions were likely to be uniform and 
repetitive.62 However, with business models such as fast fashion, orders are likely to 
vary significantly in terms of product design and characteristics and this favours a 
more market-like system of production if the full specification and self-containment 
of transactions are possible. The flexibility of a modular system can then help to 
secure the efficiency advantages associated with market transactions in terms of 
price minimisation and speed of performance. Brand owners can also make use of 
contractual safeguards such as penalties to offset the remaining risks of lacking 
direct control over production or the ability to supervise it closely.63 
Separating the demand-related activities of marketing and product 
development and design from the supply-related activity of production has enabled 
them to develop separately according to their own economies of scale and scope 
and with the specific capabilities they require. The potential advantages to some 
firms of being able to separate these activities have increased as marketing has 
become an activity that can be conducted on a much wider scale and as 
developments in technology have enabled production to be conducted efficiently 
on a much smaller scale and to be controlled remotely through contractual 
mechanisms. Instead of managing production directly, brand owners have 
developed the capabilities necessary for exploiting and managing global value 
chains. Moreover, the advantages to brand owners of being able to outsource 
                                                          
62 O.E. Williamson, n. 53, at 239 and 246-247.  
63 G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey and T. Sturgeon, n. 52, at 80.  
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production into a market-like structure are further increased by the bargaining 
power they enjoy as buyers in this market. 
The above factors help to explain why lead firms can rely on the flexibility of 
modular value chains to reduce the costs and increase the turnaround of 
production and yet can still exercise sufficient control over production to protect 
their goodwill, at least insofar as their goodwill is based on product quality and 
other “product characteristics”. The mechanisms by which lead firms can exercise 
this control and manage their relationships with their suppliers in this kind of 
institutional structure has been termed “industrial governance”.64 Nevertheless, the 
lead firms’ lack of direct control over production and the processes it involves 
means that they have no easy means of controlling and therefore determining and 
verifying the “process characteristics” of their products such as the impact of their 
production on the environment or the conditions under which they are produced.65 
Whilst lack of control over these matters reflects the economic rationale of 
outsourcing, it raises two further issues. One concerns the attempts that various 
parties have made to close this apparent “governance gap” by cajoling lead firms 
into doing more to ensure that process characteristics comply with a minimum set 
of standards. This issue has been referred to as one of “global governance”.66 The 
second issue concerns the proposition, noted in the introduction to this article, that 
the vulnerability of brands to bad publicity concerning process characteristics 
means that their owners have good reason to close the governance gap in any 
                                                          
64 J. Bair and F. Palpacuer, n. 9, at S2. 
65 M. Chon, n. 23. See further D.A. Kysar, “Preferences for Processes: The Process/ Product 
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice”, (2004) 118 Harvard Law Review 525-642. 
66 J. Bair and F. Palpacuer, n. 9, at S2. 
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event. Section 5 will consider these issues, but section 4 will first look more closely 
at the role of trade marks in facilitating the transformation of production that this 
section has described and in providing brand owners with their “Achilles’ heel”.  
 
4. THE ROLE OF TRADE MARKS IN GLOBAL VALUE 
CHAINS 
The firms in Rana Plaza have been aptly described as “‘invisible” suppliers because 
the brands under which the garments they produced were marketed and sold were 
the focal points for the attention and demand of consumers and the sources 
consumers looked to for guidance on reassurance on style, quality and other 
matters of concern.67 It was the owners of these brands who enjoyed the benefits 
of goodwill and the bargaining power this confers. The importance of branding in 
marketing and in consumers’ decision-making grew with the rise of the mass 
production and distribution of consumer goods towards the end of the nineteenth 
century.68  This change had increased the distance between producers and 
consumers and required a substitute for the trust based on personal knowledge 
and direct communication that had previously guided consumers’ decision-making 
and provided the foundation for goodwill. The importance of brands (and their 
trade mark signifiers) as a demand-pulling mechanism has grown further with the 
                                                          
67 L. Talbot, “Trying to Save the World with Company Law? Some Problems”, (2016) 36 LS 513-534 at 
518. 
68 M. Wilkins, n. 6; R. Church and C. Clark, “Product Development of Branded, Packaged Household 
Goods in Britain, 1870-1914: Colman’s, Reckitt’s and Lever’s”, (2001) 2 Enterprise and Society 503-
542. 
 21 
 
development of new forms of marketing, communication and search based on 
digital technology towards the end of the twentieth century and with the 
emergence of the complex business structures and production arrangements that 
market globalisation has facilitated.  
The basis of the role of trade marks in marketing, communication and the 
attraction of demand is their exclusivity as a form of property to one firm or other 
undertaking.69 Through registering a sign as a trade mark, a firm gains the exclusive 
right to use the sign to brand products of the kind or kinds for which it has been 
registered. The firm can use the sign to establish and signify a distinctive and 
exclusive identity for marketing products, an identity of this kind roughly 
corresponding to a “brand”.70 The names, logos and other signifiers of brands are 
likely to be trade marks and the exclusivity of a brand to one firm gives it an 
institutional character with the capacity to acquire a reputation, an image and 
other associations. It can connect products to a track record and heritage and can 
even give them a form of personality.71 This can increase the appeal of branded 
products for several reasons, but especially because of the guidance and 
reassurance it can provide to consumers about quality and other matters of 
concern.72 Trade marks can also help firms to market different lines of products 
                                                          
69 An “undertaking” includes a company or any other entity or organisation that operates as a 
cohesive unit: Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 [38]-[39].  
70 D.R. Desai and S. Weber Waller, “Brands, Competition, and Antitrust Law” in D.R. Desai, I. Lianos 
and S. Weber Waller (eds.), Brands, Competition Law and IP (CUP, 2015) 75-112 at 77-83. 
71 R. Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations and Corporate Imagery in 
American Big Business (University of California Press, 2001) at 7-47; C. Gorman, “The Role of 
Trademark Law in the History of US Visual Identity Design, c. 1860-1960”, (2017) 30 Journal of 
Design History 371-388. 
72 A.P. Griffiths, “Quality in European Trade Mark Law”, (2013) 11 Northwestern Journal of Technology 
and Intellectual Property 621-641. 
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that are designed to appeal to different groups of consumers through establishing 
and signifying different brands. The owner’s exclusive control over each brand and 
the products that can be sold under it means that they can acquire different sets of 
associations and differentiate products in different ways.73 This can be useful for 
the marketing of fashion products.  
 Trade mark law reinforces an owner’s exclusive control over the sign it has 
registered as a trade mark through entitling the owner to prevent the unauthorised 
use of identical or similar signs across a range of product kinds, with the scope of 
this protection broadly expanding in line with the trade mark’s distinctiveness as a 
sign and the level of recognition it has achieved in the minds of consumers.74 As 
well as protecting the power of the brand that it signifies to attract demand, these 
rights enable the owner to use identical and similar signs to exploit this power 
through signifying connection to the brand and to achieve cross-pollination of this 
power across a wide range of markets.  
The contribution of trade marks to the ability of lead firms to attract 
demand and build goodwill does not rest only on their role in establishing and 
signifying exclusive identities for marketing products. They also provide a reliable 
means of referring to branded products in advertising and other marketing activity 
and in general communication. This gives their owners a valuable communication 
                                                          
73 Andrew (John) v Kuehnrich (1913) 30 RPC 677(CA). See T. da Silva Lopes and M. Casson, 
“Entrepreneurship and the Development of Global Brands”, (2007) 81 Business History Review 651-
680 at 655. 
74 Directive, arts. 5(1)(b) and 5(2); 1994 Act, ss. 10(2) and 10(3). On art. 5(1)(b), see Case C-251/95 
Sabel v Puma  [1997] ECR I-6013; Case C-39/97 Canon v MGM [1998] ECR I-5507; Case C-342/97 
Lloyd Schuhfabrik v Klijsen Handel [1999] ECR I-3819; on art. 5(2), see Case C-252/07 Intel v CPM 
[2008] ECR I-8823; Case C-487/07 L’Oréal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185; Case C-252/12 Specsavers v Asda 
[2013] Bus LR 1277. 
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mechanism for promoting their products and soliciting demand for them. It gives 
consumers a means of obtaining or receiving information about the branded 
products from various sources including recommendations, reviews and expert 
opinions. Where trade marks signify verbally, they also give consumers a means of 
expressing demand for the branded products and for making searches for and 
enquiries about them. Trade mark law ensures that third parties selling or 
marketing products of the relevant kind must respect a trade mark’s legal meaning 
as a specific reference to branded products when they respond to consumers’ 
searches, requests or enquiries that use the trade mark as a reference point 
regardless of a consumer’s actual intention in doing so.75 Whilst third parties are 
free to promote, suggest or supply alternatives, they must make it clear to 
consumers and internet users that these products are not branded products or 
economically-linked in any way to branded products.76 
Brands and their trade mark signifiers enable their owners to attract 
demand to their products and to build goodwill in various ways and for various 
reasons. In the case of fast fashion products, a key factor is the reputation a brand 
has gained with consumers for selling products that are suitable for their purposes, 
good value and unlikely to disappoint them. Consumers are likely to be seeking a 
combination of novelty or modishness in style and design and adequate material 
                                                          
75 Havana Cigar v Oddenino [1923] 1 Ch 179 (CA); Sales Affiliates v Le Jean [1947] Ch 295 (HC); 
Premier Luggage & Bags v Premier Company [2002] EWCA Civ 387. This has been extended to include 
third parties’ use of a trade mark as a keyword to trigger “pop-up” advertising, sponsored links or 
other pre-arranged responses when consumers use the sign in question as a search term on-line: 
Case C-236/08-238/08) Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417; Case C-323/09 Interflora v 
Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 1440. 
76 Ibid. 
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quality at a relatively low price,77 but also to need reassurance that products are 
good value and likely to be recognised by others as fashionable and “on trend” at 
the time when they are purchased.78 Brands can help provide this reassurance to 
consumers. Moreover, the role of their trade mark signifiers as communication 
devices can help accelerate consumer awareness that branded products are in 
fashion.79 For this reason, trade marks have been recognised as an important, if not 
the most important, form of intellectual property protection in the fashion 
industry.80 They are particularly valuable for products with designs and styles that 
are rapidly upgraded and therefore likely to become rapidly obsolete. The fact that 
a product with a particular design and style is marketed under a brand that 
consumers associate with stylish and well-designed products can have much more 
impact on their decision-making than the design and features themselves.81  
As noted, trade marks can contribute to the impact and appeal of branded 
fashion products through conferring an image and other associations on them. A 
brand owner can cultivate this capacity through advertising and promotional 
activity and once developed it can give the consumption of branded products 
additional emotional impact, amounting to the addition of intangible quality.82 For 
certain consumers at least, consuming branded products can become a means of 
                                                          
77 See C. Campbell, n. 13. 
78 B. Hilton, C.J. Choi and S. Chen, “The Ethics of Counterfeiting in the Fashion Industry: Quality, 
Credence and Profits Issues”, (2004) 55 Journal of Business Ethics 345-354; V. Pouillard and T. 
Kuldova, “Interrogating Intellectual Property Rights in Post-War Fashion and Design”, (2017) 30 
Journal of Design History 343-355. 
79 On the importance of speed of communication in the marketing of fashion products, see K. 
Raustiala and C. Sprigman, “The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion 
Design”, (2006) 92 Virginia Law Review 1687-1777 at 1728-1732. 
80 K. Raustiala and C. Sprigman, n. 79, at 1689 and 1700-1704; A.M. Marshall, “Free Fashion”, (2013) 
17 Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 123-141 at 126-128. 
81 K. Raustiala and C. Sprigman, n. 79, at 1718-1728. 
82 Case C-59/08 Copad v Christian Dior Couture [2009] ECR I-3421 at [24]-[26].  
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satisfying emotional desires such as that for self-expression, or self-realisation or 
feeling part of a distinct community of consumers.83  
As focal points for goodwill and conveyors of a good reputation and an 
attractive image, brands can become valuable marketing resources and sources of 
strategic advantage.84 Once brands have gained this power, and for as long as it is 
maintained, their owners can add it to branded products as a form of intangible 
input and do so at a relatively low marginal cost. This can be especially profitable 
when the production of branded products can be readily scaled-up at a relatively 
low marginal cost through outsourcing into a modular value chain.  
The scope for firms to use trade marks to establish and signify brands as 
exclusive intangible resources that can attract demand and enjoy goodwill is the 
foundation of their organisational role. The other essential aspects of this role are 
the absolute control that trade mark owners have over the supply of branded 
products and their discretion as to how they organise this supply. Trade mark law 
gives the owner of a trade mark the absolute right to authorise products for 
marketing as branded products.85 Where the owner has outsourced their 
production, this right entitles it to prohibit the marketing of unauthorised 
“leakages” as branded products even though they are likely to be identical to 
legitimate branded products in every other respect.86 This absolute right ensures 
                                                          
83 J.B. Swann, D.A. Aaker and M. Reback, “Trademarks and Marketing”, (2001) 91 Trademark 
Reporter 787-832 at 796-797; B. Beebe, “Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code”, (2010) 
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84 I. Lianos, “Brands, Product Differentiation and EU Competition Law” in D.R. Desai, I. Lianos and S. 
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85 Major Bros. v Franklin [1908] 1 KB 712 (HC); Primark v Lollypop Clothing [2001] FSR 637 (HC); Case 
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that only brand owners can profit from the goodwill of their brands and secures 
their strategic position as the gateways to consumers. 
A trade mark owner’s absolute right of authorisation gives it control over 
the supply of branded products. This is the basis on which it can vouch for these 
products to consumers and ensure that they conform to and do not detract from a 
good reputation that it has acquired.87 However, trade mark law does not specify or 
limit the legal mechanisms through which an owner can exercise its control and 
does not even require the owner to exercise its control effectively.88 The owner has 
discretion as to the arrangements it makes and the freedom to vary these 
arrangements even though this may weaken the level of direct control that it can 
exercise over the supply.89 This organisational flexibility has facilitated 
transformations in the activities in which lead firms engage and the rise of global 
value chains as an institutional structure. Changes of this kind are usually driven by 
the interest of lead firms in maximising their profits and this may favour the 
outsourcing of production into flexible value chains even where this may increase 
the risk of consumer disappointment with product quality or other matters of 
potential concern to them.90  
As well as its absolute right to authorise products for marketing as branded 
products, the owner of a trade mark has certain continuing rights over the further 
                                                          
87 A trade mark guarantees that “all the goods or services bearing it have been manufactured or 
supplied under the control of a single undertaking which is responsible for their quality”: Case C-
206/02 Arsenal FC v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273 at [48] and [58]. 
88 The ”decisive factor is the possibility of control over the quality of goods, not the actual exercise of 
that control”: Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 at [38].  
89 Bostitch TM [1963] RPC 183 at 197; Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 at [37]-
[38]. 
90 Scandecor Development v Scandecor Marketing, [2001] ETMR 800 (HL) at [19]. 
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marketing (or “commercialisation”) of products that it has already authorised as 
branded products. These rights are worth noting briefly because they can further 
increase the return that owners can obtain from their brands and thereby 
strengthen their bargaining power within global value chains. Under European 
Union trade mark law, a trade mark owner’s absolute right of authorisation is 
limited to authorising the first marketing of products as branded products within 
the European Economic Area (“EEA”).91 Its right is therefore “exhausted” for the 
further marketing of products once it has authorised them in this way. This means 
that the owner can prevent third parties from marketing products as branded 
products if they have been marketed as such outside the EEA.92 This territorial 
limitation on exhaustion makes it possible to set a higher market price for branded 
products inside the EEA where the strength of demand for them can support this.93  
The owner also enjoys certain continuing rights over the further marketing 
of branded products within the EEA in any event. These rights are defined loosely 
by reference to there being “legitimate reasons” for the owner “to oppose the 
further commercialisation of the goods, especially where the condition of the goods 
is changed or impaired after they have been put on the market”.94 The effect of 
these rights is to reflect and reinforce the practical significance of the owner’s 
control over supply at the point of first marketing in the EEA so as to ensure that 
the owner can still be viewed as vouching for the branded products upon further 
                                                          
91 Directive, art 7; 1994 Act, s. 12. 
92 Case C-355/96 Silhouette v Hartlauer [1998] ECR I-4799; Case C-173/98 Sebago v GB-Unic [1999] ECR 
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marketing.95 The owner can prevent parallel importers and other third parties from 
marketing products as branded products after any interference that could 
undermine the brand’s reassurance about product quality. The CJEU has also ruled 
that the owner can use these rights to protect an attractive image that the trade 
mark has acquired, for example as a symbol of prestige and luxury.96  
The CJEU has further extended the owner’s control over the further 
marketing of branded products to include the use of its trade mark in advertising or 
promotional activity designed to publicise further marketing.97 Moreover, in a case 
concerning the “Lush” brand of toiletries and cosmetics, the High Court has 
indicated that the owner of a brand with a reputation for high standards of business 
behaviour should be entitled to prohibit the use of its trade marks by third parties 
engaged in further marketing who do not comply with the owner’s standards in this 
respect.98 Recognising that the rights of brand owners extend to cover business 
behaviour in this way could strengthen their incentive to acquire such a reputation 
and to use their control at the point of first marketing to ensure that their suppliers 
observe high standards of business behaviour. The proposition that brand owners 
may have some incentive to do this in the first place leads on to the question of 
how far the vulnerability of brands and the trade marks that signify them to bad 
                                                          
95 Case C-427/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb v Paranova [1996] ECR I-3457; Case C-348/04 Boehringer 
Ingelheim v Swingward (No. 2) [2007] ECR-3391; Case C-276/05 Wellcome v Paranova [2008] ECR I-
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97 Ibid. 
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publicity concerning business behaviour in their value chains may generate 
countervailing pressure in this direction. 
 
5. TRADE MARKS AS A SOURCE OF 
COUNTERVAILING PRESSURE CONCERNING BUSINESS 
BEHAVIOUR IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
It has been argued that, when they are so motivated, lead firms with their 
bargaining power and resources can be more effective than local regulators at 
influencing firms in their value chains and enforcing standards on them.99 This 
influence is much easier to achieve where a value chain consists of familiar 
suppliers or suppliers that can be closely monitored and supervised. Where a value 
chain is modular and linked through contractual arrangements, lead chains may still 
have sufficient indirect control over the “product characteristics” of the suppliers’ 
output for the reasons described in section 3, but it is unlikely to be sufficient for 
“process characteristics” such as working conditions and environmental impact.100 
Controlling the business behaviour of a flexible network of suppliers poses much 
greater challenges. 
Lead firms have little if any legal responsibility for the behaviour of firms in 
their supply chains and their incentive to do more depends on other factors. As a 
                                                          
99 M.P. Vandenbergh, “The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global 
Governance”, (2007) 54 UCLA Law Review 913-970. See further A. Rühmkorf, n. 1, at 73-92. 
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general rule, one firm does not have any legal responsibility for the activities and 
behaviour of another firm, even in the case of a wholly-owned subsidiary.101 Legal 
responsibility usually requires a clear statutory obligation to that effect or an 
established legal basis for attributing responsibility such as agency or a direct duty 
of care.102 In the United Kingdom, a parent company may in some circumstances 
owe a direct duty of care to the employees of a subsidiary or to others affected by 
the subsidiary’s activities.103 However, this duty only arises where the parent has 
taken direct responsibility for devising a material health and safety policy for the 
subsidiary or where it controls the relevant operations.104 Issuing mandatory 
policies and standards which are intended to apply to the subsidiary to ensure 
conformity to specified standards is not sufficient.105 Nevertheless, this gives lead 
firms a good reason to be careful with how they seek to influence the standards of 
business behaviour of other firms they deal with including suppliers.106  
With globalisation, there has been a number of “soft law” initiatives to 
encourage major economic actors to take greater responsibility for the behaviour of 
firms dependent on them including suppliers and to reduce the apparent 
“governance gap”.107 These initiatives require firms to exercise greater “due 
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102 Adams v Cape Industries [1990] Ch 433 (CA); Lungowe v Vedanta Resources [2017] EWCA Civ 1528 
[67]-[90]. 
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diligence” on these matters and to report on their efforts.108 The most prominent 
initiative has been the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights of 2011,109 which require lead firms to exercise due diligence to prevent or 
mitigate adverse impacts by their suppliers on the human rights of workers and 
other parties in their neighbourhood.110 These “soft law” initiatives do not present 
lead firms with any significant risk of legal liability for business behaviour in their 
supply chains, but they are helping to establish a platform of minimum standards 
against which their performance can be evaluated and may therefore increase any 
commercial pressure on them to do more. It has been argued that they could lead 
to the emergence of a legally-enforceable duty on the part of lead firms to exercise 
the requisite due diligence.111 However, there are formidable obstacles in the way 
of finding such a general duty, even where lead firms require their suppliers to 
observe codes of conduct concerning their behaviour.112  
Nevertheless, there may still be commercial pressure on lead firms which 
are also brand owners to exercise greater control over their suppliers because of 
their interest in increasing or at least maintaining the power of their brands to 
attract demand and enjoy goodwill and to avoid publicity that could damage this. 
As the Rana Plaza disaster and its aftermath showed, the prominence that brands 
and their signifiers can gain in the minds of the public makes them particularly 
                                                          
108 See, for example, the Modern Slavery Act 2015, s. 54(4).  
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112 cf Lucky Alame v Royal Dutch Shell [2018] EWCA Civ 191 at [89] and [140]. On the scope for action 
by or on behalf of consumers, see A. Rühmkorf, n. 1, at 93-111. 
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effective as targets for bad publicity concerning poor standards of business 
behaviour in their value chains and for protests and campaigns in response to that 
publicity. As noted in section 1, this “Achilles’ heel” has been identified as a 
potential source of countervailing pressure that may help to reduce the governance 
gap that outsourcing production into global value chains has opened up.113 
However, the actual impact of this pressure on brand owners is debatable and it 
has several shortcomings as a mechanism for closing the governance gap. 
One shortcoming is the lack of direct control that brand owners have over 
business behaviour and other process characteristics when production has been 
outsourced into a modular value chain.114 As with product characteristics such as 
design and material quality, brand owners can specify process characteristics in 
their orders and seek to verify compliance, but are likely to face much greater costs 
and difficulties in ensuring compliance. This makes the transactions complex.115 The 
developments in communication and technology that have helped to mitigate 
complexity in relation to product characteristics and increase the scope for 
transactions to be self-contained do not apply so well in this context. And, as will be 
seen below, there are not the kind of recognised standards for process 
characteristics that can help to reduce complexity. Being in a good position to 
ensure compliance is likely to require greater party-dependence and reduce the 
flexibility that is a key advantage of a modular value chain for business models such 
as fast fashion. Nevertheless, some brand owners have responded to incidents of 
                                                          
113 See above at n. 23. 
114 On the categorisation of value chains, see n. 54. 
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bad publicity by only outsourcing production to suppliers that they can monitor and 
oversee.116  
A second shortcoming is that the efforts that brand owners make in practice to 
achieve greater control over process characteristics will be driven by their perception 
of the overall balance of costs and benefits of doing this. Their evaluation of the 
potential costs from incidents triggering bad publicity is likely to depend on how far 
they believe they can manage these as short-term “public relations” challenges rather 
than significant threats to their longer-term profitability. A key factor in this 
assessment will be the clarity, objectivity and completeness of the messages that can 
be conveyed to consumers and others about process characteristics and a brand 
owner’s efforts in this respect. There are some major problems here.117 Brand owners 
may provide information, but its accuracy, completeness and true significance usually 
requires external verification from credible third parties such as non-governmental 
campaigning organisations. Like brand owners, these third parties face the inherent 
difficulty of monitoring the behaviour of suppliers from outside, especially when it 
may be hard to identify which firms need monitoring. In the case of Rana Plaza, the 
APPB report noted a “lack of transparency” due to practices such as unauthorised sub-
contracting.118 In any event, where incidents of bad publicity occur in modular value 
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chains that supply many brands, blame for this is diluted along with the resulting 
pressure on the brand owners.119 
The lack of reliable and meaningful information about standards of business 
behaviour is exacerbated by the lack of the kind of specific, objective and generally-
recognised standards that would provide a clear benchmark for effective 
accountability.120 This gives brand owners even more scope to engage in public 
relations activity to shape or manipulate consumers’ perceptions of the publicity 
and information that is available,121 for example as to how well they have 
responded to incidents of bad publicity. There is a multiplicity of conflicting and 
competing apparent standards that brand owners can invoke, which come from a 
variety of sources and have varying degrees of objectivity and reliability. These 
include schemes such as certification marks operated by trusted third parties such 
as the Fairtrade Foundation,122 but also schemes set up by the brands themselves 
or their trade associations.123 Rather than mitigating the problems that consumers 
and others face in acquiring meaningful information or credible reassurance about 
business behaviour, brands in this context are more likely to increase them with 
“informational clutter”.124  
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A third shortcoming is that the strength of commercial pressure that bad 
publicity puts on brand owners depends on how consumers and other parties are 
likely to respond to such publicity in practice. It seems inappropriate to rely on 
consumers and other parties who are not directly affected by standards of business 
behaviour in value chains to take responsibility for improving them by factoring it 
into their decision-making.125 This approach subordinates the interests of workers 
and other affected parties to the discretion and whims of unaffected parties. It 
looks to unaffected parties to give weight to these in transactions in which they 
would otherwise pursue their own best interests.126 Even if they do attach 
importance to process characteristics, consumers must weigh the information and 
reassurance they receive about these against other matters of importance to them 
such as price, product quality, quality assurance and emotional impact. With fast 
fashion products, consumers tend to prioritise price along with reassurance that 
products are fashionable over the reassurance that an ethical reputation can 
provide about process characteristics, as the example of Phantom Tac Ltd has 
shown.127 There is little evidence to suggest that incidents of bad publicity have had 
much long-term effect on consumer behaviour.128 
Nevertheless, there are firms that use a good reputation for social 
responsibility as part of their business model.129 As noted in section 4, trade mark 
law could strengthen the position of such firms by confirming that their continuing 
rights over the further marketing of branded products can protect a good 
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reputation covering process characteristics as well as a good reputation covering 
product characteristics.130 This could help to increase the incentive that brand 
owners have to develop such a reputation. However, this alone is unlikely to carry 
much weight in the absence of clear, meaningful and reliable information for 
evaluating the actual performance of brand owners in this respect. 
Moreover, the potential response of consumers and others to a good 
reputation concerning business behaviour or to incidents of bad publicity is just one 
factor in the overall balance of costs and benefits that is likely to drive the decision-
making of brand owners in relation to outsourcing. It has been argued that efforts 
to achieve real improvement in standards of business behaviour in global value 
chains should address these maters directly and take account of the bargaining 
power of the lead firms and the buying practices that put pressure on these 
standards.131 It has also been argued that expecting lead firms to take responsibility 
for this amounts to recognising and reinforcing their strategic position and the 
factors that underlie this.132 In any event, pushing brand owners to use their 
bargaining power to improve standards in value chains and not to create pressure 
that reduces these is likely to require much more than fear of adverse publicity. It 
will require specific regulation and more stringent accountability mechanisms along 
with the development of a clear set of objective standards audited by effective and 
reliable third parties.133 It is within such a framework that the commercial 
accountability for production that branding achieves could have greater value as a 
                                                          
130 See above at n. 65. 
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transmission mechanism for channelling information and publicity and acting as a 
source of countervailing pressure on brand owners. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This article has shown how the legal protection of trade marks has enabled firms to 
establish brands for their products and to separate the activities of demand-
attraction and supply-provision. The ability to do this has influenced the 
development of the main actors in many industries, including the ready-made 
garment industry. They have been able to compete for demand at the global level 
and to outsource production into global value chains in which they enjoy strategic 
power. This in turn has enabled them to adopt business models that require a faster 
pace of production at a lower cost. Their bargaining power and the buying practices 
that their business models require can generate pressure in global value chains and 
the Rana Plaza disaster has shown the consequences that this pressure can 
sometimes have. 
As brand owners, firms that have good access to consumers or are well-
placed to engage in marketing have been able to focus their resources on product 
development and on attracting demand through the design and differentiation of 
their products, their ability to provide quality assurance and the cultivation of 
emotional appeal. These “weightless” firms can focus on these higher-value activities 
whilst avoiding direct involvement in and responsibility for producing the supply to 
satisfy the demand they attract. They have adopted business models that involve 
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rapid product development and product obsolescence in their pursuit of profit. 
Global value chains have proved well-suited to producing the requisite supply at the 
speed and cost needed to satisfy the demand that these firms can attract. This 
organisational transformation has had an impact on working conditions, the 
environment and other matters associated with production. Brand owners have 
externalised direct responsibility for these process characteristics onto other firms. 
Firms engaged in production lack significant bargaining power and must compete for 
orders from brand owners on price and their ability to meet tight deadlines. The 
pressure that this form of competition involves is not conducive to observing good 
standards of business behaviour. 
Trade marks, as the signifiers of brands, do ensure that their owners have 
some commercial accountability for their suppliers through providing a transmission 
mechanism that can be used to link branded products to their commercial 
provenance and therefore to the firms that produced them. As Rana Plaza showed, 
publicity concerning poor working conditions in suppliers can be directed at the 
brands these firms supply, thereby exposing the brands to reputational damage. The 
branding of products thus gives consumers some scope for giving weight to process 
characteristics in their decision-making, if they so desire, and this in turn may give 
brand owners some incentive to do more to ensure that standards in their supply 
chains are satisfactory and unlikely to attract bad publicity. However, the strength of 
this countervailing pressure and the incentive that it provides depends on the clarity, 
completeness and reliability of the information that can be made available to 
consumers about business behaviour and other process characteristics, the weight 
that consumers are willing to put on this in practice and how the weight of these 
 39 
 
potential responses factors into the overall balance of costs and benefits facing brand 
owners. This article has noted various shortcomings in relation to each of these and 
concluded that branding is unlikely to transmit sufficient countervailing pressure to 
make a significant difference. The limited impact that the Rana Plaza disaster seems 
to have had on the appeal and profitability of the brands that the firms based there 
had been supplying is consistent with this view. 
Trade mark law could improve the position a little by confirming that the 
owners of brands with a good reputation for standards of business behaviour and 
other process characteristics are entitled to ensure these standards are observed 
throughout their value chains, including by firms involved in further marketing. This 
would strengthen the incentive of brand owners to cultivate such a reputation. 
Beyond this, reducing the chances of a disaster like Rana Plaza recurring would 
require stringent regulation and accounting requirements that place much greater 
legal responsibility on brand owners for standards of business behaviour and other 
process characteristics in their value chains. The commercial accountability that 
brands and their trade mark signifiers provide would be a useful supplement to such 
measures and help to increase their effectiveness. However, counteracting the 
incentives and pressures that lay behind the Rana Plaza disaster and minimising the 
risk of recurrence would require even more radical measures that address the 
strategic power of brand owners as economic actors, the legal mechanisms they use 
to reinforce their power and their freedom to pursue business models that put such 
pressure on their suppliers. 
 
